Categoría: Models of Sentience

  • Philosopher Philip Goff answers questions about panpsychism

    «—we need both the science and the philosophy to get a theory of consciousness. The science gives us correlations between brain activity and experience. We then have to work out the best philosophical theory that explains those correlations. In my view, the only theory that holds up to scrutiny is panpsychism.

    When I studied philosophy, we were taught that there were only two approaches to consciousness: either you think consciousness can be explained in conventional scientific terms, or you think consciousness is something magical and mysterious that science will never understand. I came to think that both of these views were pretty hopeless. I think we can have hope that we will one day have a science of consciousness, but we need to rethink what science is. Panpsychism offers us a way of doing this.»

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  • How does the world view of a believer in physicalism differ from one of idealism?

    Physicalism is the view that no “element of reality” (Einstein) is missing from the mathematical equations of physics – more strictly, tomorrow’s physics beyond the Standard Model plus GR.
    Idealism is the view that reality is experiential.
    Most physicalists aren’t idealists, and most idealists aren’t physicalists, but a small minority of researchers are both idealists and physicalists.

    The intrinsic nature of quantum states is disputed. But if quantum mechanics is complete, and if the equations of physics describe fields of sentience rather than insentience, then physicalistic idealism is true. If so, there is no Hard Problem of consciousness as normally framed. Fields of insentience are destined to go the way of luminiferous aether. Formally, physical reality is described by the universal wavefunction. By contrast, consciousness is often said to be ill-defined. Yet if physicalistic idealism is true, then we already possess the mathematical apparatus of a theory of consciousness. All that’s hard is to “read off” the textures of experience from the solutions to the equations. The conjecture that relativistic QFT describes fields of sentience rather than insentience still leaves the mystery of why anything exists for the equations to describe: one big mystery rather than two. Yet even here, the superposition principle of QM hints at an answer.

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  • Is the Orthogonality Thesis Defensible if We Assume Both Valence Realism and Open Individualism?

    «I suppose it’s contingent on whether or not digital zombies are capable of general intelligence, which is an open question. However, phenomenally bound subjective world simulations seem like an uncharacteristic extravagance on the part of evolution if non-sphexish p-zombie general intelligence is possible. Of course, it may be possible, but just not reachable through Darwinian selection. But the fact that a search process as huge as evolution couldn’t find it and instead developed profoundly sophisticated phenomenally bound subjectivity is (possibly strong) evidence against the proposition that zombie AGI is possible (or likely to be stumbled on by accident).


    If we do need phenomenally bound subjectivity for non-sphexish intelligence and minds ultimately care about qualia valence – and confusedly think that they care about other things only when they’re below a certain intelligence (or thoughtfulness) level – then it seems to follow that smarter than human AGIs will converge on valence optimization.»

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  • Collective intelligence, ants and the binding problem

    A single neuron in the human brain can respond only to what the neurons connected to it are doing, but all of them together can be Immanuel Kant.

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    The idea of a collective consciousness (Or Anthill) is pretty simple: instead of cells you have small sentient animal that make up a larger creature. This is different from a hive mind in that the individuals of a hive mind are all sapient, but in a only the collective is.

    When I tend to think of this species, I struggle with how they would appear. Unlike with an angel, a centaur or a merperson, I lack both the inner anatomy and outer form for what they would look like. I literally am starting from the barebone scratch of a creature.

    This has made me ask, what would an anthill species look like? What would their biology be?

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    Binding prerequisites: does the substrate of consciousness require some special property which can support “ontological unity” (e.g., Pearce’s focus on quantum coherence) to bind together ‘micro-experiences’, or should we focus on information-theoretic aggregation techniques (e.g., IIT’s
    Minimum Information Partition)?

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  • God or consciousness?

    A quote from Max Planck:

    “All matter originates and exists only by virtue of a force which brings the particle of an atom to vibration and holds this most minute solar system of the atom together. We must assume behind this force the existence of a conscious and intelligent mind. This mind is the matrix of all matter.”

    https://www.goodreads.com/quotes/1328821-all-matter-originates-and-exists-only-by-virtue-of-a

    What is Max Planck talking about? Consciousness? Sentience? Panpsychism? God?

  • The science of consciousness and the science of suffering

    Most of us are primarily interested in the problem of suffering, and secondarily in the question of consciousness. Because suffering is a phenomenal phenomenon we need to know what is consciousness. This seems to be important in how we approach the question of consciousness here.

    Currently, the science of consciousness and the science of suffering are still in a pre-natal stage, the former being almost born, the latter just conceived. We cannot ‘define’ what we don’t know yet, but we may begin a scientific approach with working definitions.

    It seems clear to me that consciousness and suffering are in another category than a table, a mountain or baldness. Life is a better comparison, but not adequate yet. To get good working definitions, I suggest that we consider that consciousness and suffering are phenomena in two senses:

    – an object or aspect known through the senses rather than by thought or intuition (consciousness and suffering are known like that, by an «immediate sense», unlike the «categories» of table, mountain, baldness or life)

    – a fact or event of scientific interest susceptible to scientific description and explanation (consciousness, suffering and life are like that, but not a table, a mountain, or baldness)

    — Robert Daoust

  • Monism, dualism, trialism, quadrialism and beyond

    «Monistic theories (monism) defend a single type of substance that composes reality (for example, matter -materialism-. Others instead claim that the spirit or psyche -panpsychism-).

    Dualistic theories (dualism) defend two types of substances (for example, body and mind) or two worlds (earth and sky).

    Trialist theories (trialism) defend the existence of three types of substances or three types of realities. The graphic presented here resonates with the doctrine of the three worlds of Karl Popper. In it, Popper divides the world into three categories:

    • World 1: Physical. The world of objects, not only visible, also things that escape the human eye. It is the world of physical objects.
    • World 2: Experience / Feeling. The world of mental processes, conscious or unconscious. It is the place where feelings of pain, pleasure and thought occur. It is the world of subjective experiences.
    • World 3: Ideas / Knowledge. It is the world where objective knowledge is found.

    In his book “In search of a better world”, in the first of his articles (“Knowledge and configuration of reality”), Popper speaks of three worlds. World 1, the material; world 2, that of experience, and world 3, that of the products of the human mind; and indicates that it seems clear that world 1 is the creator of world 2.

    In a way trialism could be considered a level of complexity sufficient to represent all theories, but from other approaches, it may not be enough, and we have to go to a quadrialism (adding identity as a fourth element) and even go further. A complete simulation environment must support monism, dualism, trialism, quadrialism, etc.»

    Source: What are the different types of elements that constitute reality in its most essential aspect?

  • The metaphysics of the end of suffering

    Things do not fall down, but are attracted to the center of planet Earth, this being a model that can be complicated including other celestial bodies. The difference is not important at the local level, but it is fundamental to understand it if our plan includes escaping from the planet. In the same way, knowing what sentience really is (Open Individualism, Empty Individualism) does not seem very important if this in practice manifests itself in other ways (Closed Individualism), but in a project that pretends to escape from all suffering it is absolutely essential. Of course, this may sound as far-fetched and ambitious as escaping the gravity of planet Earth. A few centuries ago no one in his right mind would have proposed something like that, or if he had, he would have been ridiculed as a pretentious madman.

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  • Consciousness and the binding-problem

    While panpsychism sounds crazy, it is actually a highly viable theory of consciousness, as long as it is distinguished from animism: the view that everything is alive and therefore possesses agency, intentionality, thoughts, emotions, etc. Elementary particles almost certainly are not endowed any of these attributes, but according to (my take on) panpsychism, they have a very fundamental kind of consciousness, perhaps something akin to the feeling of presence or “being there.” —Kenneth Shinozuka

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  • Simulating philosophical hypotheses about sentience

    Simulations can be used to understand and evaluate the different theories and metaphysical hypotheses in relation to sentience. We can use simulations as educational tools to better understanding of the different hypotheses, theories, paradigms and worldviews on sentience, as well as their implications, providing clarity in the debate about the details and alternatives within each of the theories. Also, simulations can help in the search of good arguments to assess the plausibility of the different theories, so that we can have better criteria to allocate more or less resources to investigate or take into account one or the other within a plan to reduce future suffering.

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